Bubble Contagion: Evidence from Japan's Asset Price Bubble of the 1980-90s

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Abstract
This paper subjects one of the most documented asset price bubbles of the 1980-90s in Japan, to the rigors of recent time series-based econometric tests. We focus on testing for bubbles in the Japanese stock and real estate markets from 1970Q1 to 1999Q4 using the right-tailed unit root test of Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015, PSY). We also utilize the econometric methods of Greenaway-McGregory and Phillips (2016) to explore the possibility of contagion between these two markets. We find significant econometric based evidence of bubbles in both markets during this period in Japan and importantly, for the first time in the literature, signs of bubble contagion from Japan's stock market to its real estate market.

Keywords
Japanese asset price bubble
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real estate market

JEL Classifications
C12; G12; R30

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1. Introduction

Japan’s asset price bubble of the 1980-90s has attracted considerable attention in the literature. In particular, Japan experienced the most severe episode of speculation in both the stock and real estate markets in the late 1980s, see for example, French & Poterba (1991), Werner (1994) and Chirinko & Schaller (2001). The aim of this paper is to investigate this period in Japan’s financial history, using the right-tailed unit root test of Phillips, Shi & Yu (2015, PSY). The PSY test has been popularized in identifying the presence of financial bubbles. A recent study by Hu & Oxley (2017, forthcoming) subjects the South Sea and Mississippi share prices to the rigours of recent bubble detection tests. Furthermore, an additional focus of the paper is to examine potential contagion between the two markets in Japan by utilising the time-varying regression methodology of Greenaway-McGrevy & Phillips (2016).

There are two ‘myths’ attributed to the inflated Japanese real estate and stock markets where both house (land) and stock prices grew to unprecedented levels. The first was that land prices could never fall, and the second was that stock prices could only rise (Malkiel, 2003). Stone & Ziemba (1993) stated that the stock market had a value of approximately 4 trillion US Dollar at its peak in December 1989, which represented approximately 44% of the world’s stock market value. There had been sharp rises in land prices especially during the late 1980s, see Noguchi (1994), leading Stone & Ziemba (1993) to conclude that the total value of all Japanese property was valued at approximately 20 trillion US Dollar at the end of 1991, which equated to over 20% of the world’s total wealth and almost double the total value of the world’s stock markets. This leads Malkiel (2003) to suggest that if this were the case, the Japanese could have brought all the property in America by only selling the Tokyo area.

The bursting of the Japan’s asset price bubble in the early 1990s certainly destroyed those two myths. As discussed in Okina et al. (2001), the Nikkei 225 reached a historical high of 38130 in December 1989 from a start of 12,598 in September 1985, and then dropped sharply to 14,309 in August 1992, which represented a more than 60% decline from the peak. When we consider land prices in September 1990, they were around four times higher than the level in September 1985, only to drop in 1999 by approximately 80% from the peak in 1990. What we could learn from Japan’s experience is perhaps that Japan is no different from other countries that experience a bubble as no asset prices could keep rising forever. Alan Greenspan also described the sudden dramatic decline in the Japanese stock market as “a correction of the bubble in asset prices”. A decade of economic

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stagnation in the 1990s after the bursting of the Japanese asset price bubble is commonly referred to as “the Lost Decade”, see Hayashi & Prescott (2002) and Horioka (2006).

2. Method

We apply the right-tailed unit root test of Phillips, Shi & Yu (2015) to examine evidence of explosive behaviour in stock and real estate markets. The martingale null with an asymptotic drift is specified as:

\[ H_0 : y_t = d T^{-\eta} + y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t, \quad \varepsilon_t \sim \text{NID}(0, \sigma^2), \quad (1) \]

where \( d \) is a constant and the localizing coefficient \( \eta \) is greater than 1/2. The alternative hypothesis is a mildly explosive process:

\[ H_1 : y_t = \delta T y_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (2) \]

where \( \delta = 1 + c T^{-\theta} \) with \( c > 0 \) and \( \theta \in (0,1) \).

The following regression model is estimated:

\[ \Delta y_t = \alpha + \beta y_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^{K} \gamma_i \Delta y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t, \quad (3) \]

where \( \alpha \) is an intercept.

The generalized sup ADF (GSADF) test relies on repeated estimation of the ADF test regression of Equation (3) on subsamples of the data in a recursive fashion. The window size \( r_w \) expands from \( r_0 \) to 1, where \( r_0 \) is the minimum window size. The end point \( r_2 \) varies from \( r_0 \) to 1 and the starting point \( r_1 \) varies from 0 to \( r_2 - r_0 \). The GSADF statistic is the largest ADF statistic over the range of \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \):

\[ \text{GSADF}(r_0) = \sup_{r_2 \in [r_0, 1]} \sup_{r_1 \in [0, r_2 - r_0]} \text{ADF}_{r_1}^{r_2}. \]

The backward SADF (BSADF) statistic is defined as the sup value of the ADF statistic sequence:

\[ \text{BSADF}_{r_2}(r_0) = \sup_{r_1 \in [0, r_2 - r_0]} \text{ADF}_{r_1}^{r_2}, \]

where the BSADF statistic and its corresponding critical value are used for dating the origination and termination dates of a bubble. The minimum window size \( r_0 \) is equal to 0.01 + 1.8/\( \sqrt{T} \). A fixed lag order of 0 is selected. Critical values are simulated using 2,000 replications.
We then apply the time-varying regression approach of Greenaway-McGrevy & Phillips (2016), to which the reader is referred for details, to examine evidence of bubble contagion. The same notation as Greenaway-McGrevy & Phillips (2016) is adopted here. They fit the following regression

\[
\hat{\beta}_{j,s} = \delta_{i1} + \delta_{2j} \left( \frac{S}{T - S + 1} \right) \hat{\beta}_{\text{core},s} + \text{error}_s, s = S, \ldots, T,
\]

for some initialization date \( S \) for \( j \neq \text{core} \), where \( \text{core} \) denotes a core market where the asset bubble is hypothesized to originate. The non-negative delay parameter \( d \) that captures the lag in market contagion from the core market to other regions and \( \delta_{2j} \) is the time-varying coefficient.

The time varying coefficient function \( \delta_{2j}(r) \) may be estimated by local level kernel regression such that:

\[
\hat{\delta}_{2j}(r; h; d) = \frac{1}{h} \sum_{s=S}^{T} K_h(r - \frac{s - T - d + 1}{h}) \hat{\beta}_{j,s} - \frac{1}{T - S + 1} \sum_{s=S}^{T} \hat{\beta}_{j,s},
\]

where \( K_h(r) = \frac{1}{h} K \left( \frac{s - T - r}{h} \right) \), \( K(.) \) is a Gaussian kernel function and \( h \) is a bandwidth parameter. The bandwidth \( h \) is selected using a simple cross-validation approach and estimated as

\[
h_{j,T}(d) = \min_{h \in [H_T^{-1/2}, x_0^{-1/10}]} \sum_{s=S}^{T} \left( \hat{\beta}_{j,s} - \hat{\delta}_{2j} \left( \frac{S}{T - S + 1}; h, d \right) \hat{\beta}_{\text{core},s} - d \right)^2,
\]

where \( H_T = [(T - S - d + 1)^{-1/2}, (T - S - d + 1)^{-1/10}] \) and

\[
\delta_{2j} \left( \frac{S}{T - S + 1}; h, d \right) = \frac{\sum_{p=S, p \neq s}^{T} K_h \left( \frac{s}{T - S + 1} \right) \hat{\beta}_{j,p} \hat{\beta}_{\text{core},p} - d}{\sum_{s=S}^{T} K_h \left( \frac{s}{T - S + 1} \right) \hat{\beta}_{\text{core},p} - d}.
\]

The optimal lag order \( \hat{d}_j \) minimizes the MSE of the contagion equation.

\[
\hat{d}_j = \min_{d \in \{0, 1, \ldots, 4\}} \sum_{s=S}^{T} \left( \hat{\beta}_{j,s} - \hat{\delta}_{2j} \left( \frac{S}{T - S + 1}; h_{j,T}(d), d \right) \hat{\beta}_{\text{core},s} - d \right)^2
\]

The resulting response function has the form \( \hat{\delta}_{2j} \left( r; h_{j,T}(d), \hat{d}_j \right) \) with optimal bandwidth and lag order choices.

3. Data

We obtain the house price-rent ratio for Japan between 1970Q1 and 1999Q4 from the OECD Main Economic Indicators. The 10-year cyclically adjusted price-earnings (CAPE) ratio (also known as Shiller PE Ratio) for Japan between 1970M1 and 1999M12 is obtained from the Global Financial Data. Due to the data frequency, we create a quarterly CAPE ratio by averaging. Both the price-rent
ratio and CAPE ratio data are transformed to natural logarithms. A time series plot for both ratios is provided as Figure 1. It can be seen from Figure 1 that both ratios rise dramatically after the mid-1970s, where the CAPE ratio and house price-rent ratio climb to peaks in 1989 and 1991, and then decline sharply.

4. Results

We provide date-stamping outcomes for both Japan’s stock and real estate markets in Figure 2. The null of no explosive behaviour in Japan’s price-earnings ratio is strongly rejected at the 1% level (3.7536 > 2.6738), which suggests strong evidence of bubbles. As shown in Figure 2a, we identify a bubble between 1983Q2 and 1990Q3 in the stock market, which is clearly related to Japan’s asset price bubble. On the other hand, Japan’s real estate market also exhibits bubble-like behaviour as shown by Figure 2b. The null of no explosive behaviour in Japan’s house price-rent ratio is also rejected at the 1% level (8.2139 > 2.6738), indicating very strong evidence of bubbles. As presented as Figure 2b, we find two bubbles in the 1980s (e.g., 1981Q2-1984Q2 and 1987Q2-1992Q2). Of particular interest is that the bubble, which originated in 1987Q2 and collapsed in 1992Q2, is linked with Japan’s asset price bubble. Overall, we provide overwhelming evidence of bubbles for both markets during this

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3 Phillips & Shi (2017, forthcoming) recommend users identifying false positive identification episodes ex-post using the PSY procedure, we therefore only report the presence of a bubble in this paper.
We believe that the bubble migrates from the stock market to the real estate market for three reasons. First, the stock price-earnings ratio reached its peak in 1989 while the price-rent ratio climbed to its maximum in 1991. Second, the stock market exhibits bubble-like behaviour earlier than housing market during the late 1980s. Third, transaction costs are much lower in the stock market as people can simply and quickly sell off their shares and then invest in the housing market.

Using the approach of [Greenaway-McGrevy & Phillips (2016)], we let the fixed window size $S$ be 50 and delay parameter $d$ be 4. The time-varying coefficient estimates are plotted as Figure 3, which clearly shows an inverted U shape. As discussed in [Greenaway-McGrevy & Phillips (2016)], the contagion coefficient may take an inverted U shape as it grows over the time before climbing to a peak and then declining. Figure 3 demonstrates signs of migration from the core market (stock market) to the real estate market as the sensitivity rises to a peak in 1993 and then declines, which is the major finding in this paper.

5. Conclusion

This paper has two key contributions. First, it presents empirical evidence to support the existence of an asset price bubble in Japan in the late 20th century using the right tailed unit root test of [Phillips, Shi & Yu (2015) PSY] as we find overwhelming evidence in both the stock and real estate markets between the 1980s and the early 1990s. Second and more importantly, we then apply the [Greenaway-McGrevy & Phillips (2016)] methodology to detect possible contagion between the two markets. Our results show signs of bubble migration from the Japan’s stock market to its housing market for the first time in the literature.

4 We also apply the PSY procedure to the Japan’s CAPE and house price-rent ratios to take into account the presence of possible heteroscedasticity using wild bootstrapping. We identify a bubble in the stock market (1980Q4-1995Q2) and two bubbles in the real estate market (1981Q1-1986Q4 and 1987Q3-1993Q1). The conclusion of bubbles in both markets still holds. Results are not shown here to conserve the space, but are available upon request.

5 Deng et al. (2017) also find signs of bubble migration from the stock market to the housing market in China using weekly data between 2005 and 2010.

6 A fixed window subsample method is utilized for selecting the subsample sequence of estimated autoregressive coefficients as suggested by [Greenaway-McGrevy & Phillips (2016)]. We also try different choices of the fixed window size $S$ and delay parameter $d$, and the results remain unchanged.
Figure 2: Date-stamping strategy of CAPE ratio and house price-rent ratio in Japan between 1970Q1 and 1999Q4.
Figure 3: Time-varying contagion coefficient from the Japanese stock market to the real estate market.

References


